DEAD MEN TELLING TALES – A POLICY-BASED PROPOSAL FOR
SURVIVABILITY OF QUI TAM ACTIONS UNDER THE CIVIL FALSE
CLAIMS ACT
Vickie J. Williams1
“You are well on your way to becoming a pirate already . . . you are obsessed with
treasure.”
Captain Jack Sparrow (Johnny Depp) to William Turner
(Orlando Bloom) in PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN, THE CURSE
OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney 2003).

“Yes I am a pirate, two hundred years too late. The cannons don’t thunder, there’s
nothing to plunder, I’m an over-forty victim of fate.”
Jimmy Buffett, A Pirate Looks at Forty, on SONGS YOU KNOW
BY HEART (MCA Records 1990).

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the demise of job security for pirates during the modern age lamented by
singer/songwriter Jimmy Buffett in “A Pirate Looks at Forty,” the box-office success of
recent movies about pirates such as Walt Disney Studio’s “Pirates of the Caribbean—The
Curse of the Black Pearl” evidences the continued appeal of treasure-hunting and
swashbuckling in the modern world. Therefore, it should be no surprise that a statute
passed by Congress almost 140 years ago, designed to encourage private citizens to dig
deeply into the affairs of entities that contract with the federal government in search of
wrongdoing and extract buried treasure, continues to appeal to the watchdogs of the
public fisc. More than a century after its birth as a fraud-fighting tool during wartime, the
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civil False Claims Act2 [hereinafter, “the Act”] continues to pique the imagination and
fuel dreams of bounty and glory for both publicly anointedfraud -fighters and private
persons who are authorized to sue on behalf of themselves and the Government under the
Act’s unique “qui tam”3 provisions.4 Consider the following modern-day uses of the Act,
which illustrate its continued appeal to private citizens:
In order to be reimbursed for their costs in caring for Medicare patients,
hospitals prepare a “cost report” and submit it to the federal government.
A Chief Financial Officer of a hospital in Whitefish, Montana refused to
prepare an “aggressive” cost report for submission to Medicare and an
inconsistent “reserve” cost report for submission to the hospital’s auditors.
The “aggressive” cost report showed greater costs to the hospital for
caring for Medicare patients than the “reserve” cost report showed. The
CFO was terminated from his position. In the course of pursuing a
wrongful termination action against the hospital’s management company,
which was a national company, the CFO discovered that all of the
hospitals managed by the company submitted “aggressive” cost reports to
Medicare that he considered fraudulent. The CFO filed a qui tam action
under the Act against the management company, resulting in a total
settlement payment of $85,773,745.81 by the company and a recovery of
$20,585,698.99 by the CFO;5
A sales representative for a cardiovascular device manufacturer filed a qui
tam suit under the Act against 132 teaching hospitals. He alleged that they
had defrauded federal health care programs by submitting claims and
receiving payments for services provided to patients participating in
clinical trials involving cardiac devices that had not been fully approved
for marketing by the Food and Drug Administration, in violation of a
provision of a 1986 Medicare Manual that stated that payment would not
be made for such procedures. The case, filed in 1994, continues ten years
later against forty hospitals. The government and the sales representative
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have collected millions of dollars from teaching hospitals that have settled
the cases against them;6
A disgruntled doctoral student brought a qui tam action under the Act
against his former faculty advisor, alleging that the faculty advisor
collaborated with other researchers to publish scholarly articles based on
fabricated research and used the publications to defraud the Veterans
Administration. The complaint was ultimately dismissed, but not before
the defendant incurred significant costs by being forced to defend the
matter on the student’s appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.7
Recoveries under the Act are potentially enormous because the Act authorizes the
imposition of treble damages and substantial per-claim penalties against its violators.8
The magnitude of potential recovery provides federal prosecutors with a strong incentive
to use the Act. Nevertheless, this powerful weapon does not work only for the federal
government. The Act’s “qui tam” or whistleblower provision allows a private party to
sue on its own behalf as well as on behalf of the United States, and collect a substantial
bounty if the suit is successful.9 Actions brought by whistleblowers under the Act have
recovered a total of $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2003 alone.10
The similarity between whistle blowing under the Act and the pursuit of bounty
on the high seas did not go unnoticed even by the first courts to construe the statute, well
over one hundred years ago. Early in the history of the Act, one court described the qui
tam provisions of the Act as follows: “Prosecutions conducted by such means [through a
private whistleblower] compare with the ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer
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does to the slow-going public vessel.”11 The potential windfall encourages private parties
to attempt to use this fraud-fighting weapon for their own financial benefit, even when
the United States has determined that it has no interest in pursuing a particular case.12
Just as the potential rewards to the successful whistleblower are never far from
the minds of potential qui tam relators13 under the Act, the specter of financial ruin and
adverse publicity that inevitably follows a prosecution under the Act is never far from the
mind of entities that contract with the federal government.14 The magnitude of the
damages recoverable under the Act, the collateral consequences of being found liable
under the Act,15 and the inevitable tension between the United States, the relator, and the
defendant when a treasure-hunting relator independently pursues a case that the United
States has declined to pursue, gives rise to unique legal issues and challenges. In addition
to substantive legal complications, many procedural complications spring from the
complex relationship between the relator and the Government, and the unique procedural
requirements for bringing a qui tam action under the Act.16
Not least among these complications is the length of time that a qui tam case
under the Act can be under development, or filed and pending in court, before the
defendant even knows of the action’s existence. The statute of limitations for bringing a
11
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case under the Act can be as long as ten years.17 Even once a case is filed in court, the
United States can request to keep it under seal for long periods of time, in renewable
increments, at the discretion of the court.18 Additionally, along with a civil prosecution
initiated under the Act, the United States often initiates a parallel criminal proceeding
based on the same conduct, warranting a stay of the Act’s civil proceedings.19 It is also
not uncommon for the defendant to declare bankruptcy while proceedings under the Act
are pending, triggering an automatic stay of the proceedings in accordance with federal
bankruptcy law.20
Given the uncommonly long time periods that a qui tam relator’s cause of action
under the Act can remain in limbo, both prior to filing and after it is filed in court, the
prospect of a relator’s death during the pendency of the action is very real.21 When the
relator dies while the case remains pending, and the United States has declined to
intervene in the case, the court must decide whether the action survives the relator’s
death. The United States Supreme Court has issued conflicting guidance about the
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“punitive”22 or “remedial”23 nature of the Act; the distinction that is the basis for the
historical test for survivability or abatement of a federal statutory cause of action.
Therefore, lower courts faced with this question have reached conflicting conclusions.24
Part II of this article discusses the current version of the Act and its evolution
from its original 1863 version. Part III discusses the historical common-law test for
determining whether an action based on a federal statute survives or abates upon the
plaintiff’s death. It then discusses the special problems of applying this test to the Act,
caused by the dual remedial and penal nature of the Act, and the complex relationship
between the qui tam relator and the Government as plaintiffs in cases brought under the
Act. Part IV discusses the unique provisions of the Act that limit the courts’ subject
matter jurisdiction in certain cases, and the effect those provisions have on the
survivability analysis.

Part V proposes adopting a simpler, policy-based test for

survivability of a qui tam action under the Act, and explains why under this test such
cases should survive the death of a relator, except in the rare case where the court cannot
establish its subject matter jurisdiction, or the defendant is so severely prejudiced by the
absence of the relator that principles of federal civil procedure require that the case be
dismissed.
II.

THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND ITS QUI TAM
PROVISIONS
A.

The Current Version of the Civil False Claims Act

The current version of the civil False Claims Act [hereinafter, “the Act”] makes
liable any person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
22
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claim to the United States for payment or approval.25 The Act also imposes liability for
making false records or statements designed to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation
to pay or transmit money or property to the United States.26 The “knowledge” required
for violation of the Act includes actual knowledge of the false information, deliberate
ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information, and reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information.27 No specific intent to defraud is required.28 A person found
liable under the Act is subject to treble damages and penalties of up to $10,000 per
claim.29
A private person (the qui tam relator) may bring a civil action for violation of the
Act, for the person and for the United States [hereinafter, the “Government”].30 The
relator must serve the complaint and a “written disclosure of substantially all material
evidence and information the person possesses” on the Government.31 The complaint
must be filed in camera, under seal, and remains under seal for at least 60 days, subject to
the Government’s motions to extend the seal for good cause shown.32 While the case
remains under seal, the Government is supposed to investigate the claims and the
evidence revealed in the disclosure statement, and determine whether it wants to
intervene in the action and prosecute the defendant under its own name.33

If the

Government declines to intervene, the relator may pursue the case without the
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Government.34 If the relator proceeds alone, the relator is entitled to receive between
twenty-five and thirty percent of the proceeds or settlement of the action.35

If the

Government intervenes, the relator’s share is between fifteen and twenty-five percent of
the proceeds or settlement.36
B.

The Evolution of the Act

The original False Claims Act was enacted in 1863, in response to alleged fraud
and waste in government contracts between the Union army and unscrupulous private
contractors during the Civil War.37 It contained a qui tam provision from its inception.38
Qui tam statutes were imported from England, where Blackstone characterized them as
penal statutes, designed to redress wrongs to the public.39 Because the qui tam relator
sues on behalf of the Government, the relator can be looked upon as an advocate of the
public interest, taking the place of public officials who would otherwise advocate the
public interest.40 At the time of the original Act, the United States Attorney General had
little assistance in carrying out his responsibilities, and the qui tam action was a popular
means of counteracting the lack of an effective public police force for investigating and
dealing with public wrongs.41 At the time of enactment, the False Claims Act authorized
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remedies of double damages, penalties of $2,000 per false claim, and criminal
sanctions.42
Despite the potential for large monetary awards against violators of the statute,
early case law characterized the Act as remedial, but designed to protect the public
interest. In United States v. Griswold,43 the trial court stated: “The statute is a remedial
one. It is intended to protect the treasury against the hungry and unscrupulous host that
encompasses it on every side, and should be construed accordingly.”44
During the 1930s and early 1940s, the Government’s reach into the economic life
of the nation grew longer.45

More financial dealings between the Government and

private business created more opportunities for fraud and whistle blowing. Enterprising
qui tam relators began to use information in publicly available criminal indictments to
initiate civil cases under the Act.46 In the landmark case of United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess,47 the qui tam relator merely copied a publicly available criminal indictment into
a civil complaint and filed it under the then-current version of the Act.48 His complaint
requested half of the Government’s proceeds from a civil judgment based on the
complaint, although the relator brought no new information to the Government.49 The
Government argued for dismissal, on the grounds that such cases served no public
purpose, as they added nothing to the Government’s preexisting knowledge of a

42
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particular fraud, and served only to require the Government to share any recovery of
fraudulent gains with a relator who had added no value to the case.50 The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument, based on the text of the Act, which did not limit
rewards to relators who provided new information to the government.51
The Marcus decision prompted the Attorney General of the United States to
request repeal of the qui tam provisions of the Act.52 Repeal legislation passed the House
of Representatives, but the provisions were reinstituted by the Senate.53 Rather than
repeal the qui tam provisions all together, to address the seeming ability of relators to
enrich themselves under the Act with no concomitant benefit to the public, Congress
amended the Act in 1943 to absolutely bar the federal courts from having jurisdiction
over qui tam suits based on allegations known to the government before the suit was
filed.54 This jurisdictional bar remained in place even if the relator was the original
source of the government’s information.55
Although the 1943 amendments may have had the desired effect of emphasizing
the remedial nature of the Act, the courts interpreted them in such a way as to have the
undesired effect of chilling relators’ use of the statute to assist the United States in
detecting fraud and waste in government contracting.56 In 1986, in response to Congress’
perception that “[F]raud permeates generally all Government programs ranging from
welfare and food stamp benefits, to multibillion dollar defense procurements, to crop
50
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subsidies and disaster relief programs,”57 Congress amended the Act, intending to make it
easier and more attractive for relators to bring private suits under the Act.58 The most
notable changes were: (1) A clarification that specific intent to defraud was not required
to establish a violation of the Act, and that acting in deliberate ignorance of the fraud or
with reckless disregard for the truth of the information in a claim provided to the
Government was sufficient to violate the Act;59 (2) clarifying that the burden of proof for
a violation of the Act was the standard burden for civil cases, i.e., a “preponderance of
the evidence;”60 (3) lengthening the statute of limitations in certain cases;61 (4) changing
the remedy for violating the Act from double to treble damages and significantly
increasing the money penalties available under the Act;62 and (5) expanding the rights of
qui tam relators and increasing their financial incentives to bring suit under the Act.63
Despite these changes to the Act, all of which increased the harshness of the
potential remedy for violating the Act, and many of which enhanced the ability and
incentives for private persons to benefit from bringing violations of the Act to the
Government’s attention, Congress repeatedly emphasized the public yet remedial purpose
of the Act when explaining the amendments.64 Nowhere does Congress state that it
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intended to redress individual wrongs via the Act’s qui tam enforcement scheme.65 The
public interest purpose of qui tam actions under the amended Act has been recognized by
a majority of courts that have interpreted the amended Act.66
Nevertheless, since enactment of the 1986 Amendments, not every court has
agreed that the Act serves only a public purpose. In United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC
Corp.,67 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited the fact that a qui tam relator may
suffer substantial emotional and financial harm due to his unwitting involvement in fraud,
or due to his status as a relator.68 Citing these examples of possible individual harms
suffered by a relator, the Neher court held that the FCA’s qui tam provisions are intended
to redress wrongs suffered by individual relators, and not the general public.69 The Neher
court went on to hold that because the qui tam provisions of the Act are designed to
redress individual wrongs suffered by relators, they are remedial as to the relator, and
survive the relator’s death.70 The Neher court used the historical common-law test for
survivability of a federal statutory cause of action to reach this result.71

result of fraud against the Government.”); id at 6. (describing the Act as “a civil remedy designed to make
the Government whole for fraud losses”).
65
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retaliation as a result of their whistleblowing activities. See 31 U.S.C. §3730(h) (2000).
70
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A.

III. SURVIVABILITY OF A QUI TAM
CASE UNDER THE ACT
IV.
The Historical Federal Common-Law Test
The survivability of a cause of action created by federal statute is determined by

federal common law, unless there is an expression of contrary intent in the statute itself.72
There is no expression of contrary intent in the Act.73 Therefore, if we use the historical
test, we must look to federal common law to determine whether a cause of action under
the Act survives the relator’s death.
Under the historical federal common-law test for survivability, actions that are
“penal” abate upon the death of a plaintiff, while “remedial” actions survive.74 At
common law, a statute giving a private right of action against a wrongdoer was truly
“penal” only when it imposed punishment for an offense committed against the sovereign
or the state.75 Statutes that created a private right of action against a wrongdoer for a
party who was not injured by the wrongdoer (such as a qui tam relator) were
characterized as “penal” in some ways, but not “strictly” penal in the traditional sense. 76
As the United States Supreme Court explained:
The action of an owner of property against the hundred to recover
damages caused by a mob was said by Justices Willes and Buller to be
‘penal against the hundred, but certainly remedial as to the sufferer.’ Hyde
v. Cogan 2 Doug. 699, 705, 706. A statute giving the right to recover back
money lost at gaming and, if the loser does not sue within a certain time,
authorizing a qui tam action to be brought by any other person for
threefold the amount, has been held to be remedial as to the loser, though
penal as regards the suit by a common informer.77
72

Sullivan v. Associated Billposters and Distributors, et al., 6 F.2d 1000, 1004 (2d Cir. 1925).
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Statutes that provided for recovery to a party who was injured by the defendant’s
conduct were considered “remedial,” and thus survived the death of the plaintiff, while
statutes that provided for recovery to an uninjured party, even if not the public, were
considered “penal” in some sense.78 With regard to common-law claims that were not
based on statutes, suits based on claims that were considered “personal” to the plaintiff,
such as tort actions for personal injuries, abated upon the death of the plaintiff, while
suits based on property or contract rights survived the plaintiff.79
The difficulty with applying this approach to determining the survivability of a
qui tam action under the Act arises from the complex nature of the statute itself, in
addition to the complex relationship between the relator and the Government. The statute
is designed to compensate the public (the Government) for losses sustained as a victim of
fraud, and thus, fits the historical definition of a “penal” statute.80 Nevertheless, the
statute is remedial in that it authorizes recovery to an injured party.81 The difficulty
arises from the fact that the injured party is the public, against whom remedies for
offenses were traditionally considered punitive, and therefore, not survivable. The Act
codifies a remedy for the common-law tort of fraud, which was traditionally a “personal”
claim of a plaintiff that does not survive death.82 Nevertheless, when the plaintiff is a qui
tam relator, the injury asserted is the injury of the Government, a party that does not die
with the relator.83 Even where the Government has declined to intervene in the case, it
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remains a party, with the right to have all pleadings and depositions transcripts served on
it by request, and it may intervene at a later date “upon a showing of good cause.”84
1.

The Dual “Remedial” and “Penal” Nature of the Act

The dual remedial and penal nature of the Act is best illustrated by a series of
recent United States Supreme Court decisions on who can be a defendant under the Act.
In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,85 the United
States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether states were “persons” who could be
sued under the Act.86 In holding that as a matter of statutory construction, states were not
persons who could be sued under the Act, the Court described the Act as “a federal law
designed to benefit ‘the citizens of the United States, not the citizens of any individual
State that might violate the [statute]’.”87 Despite the fact that this purpose is consistent
with a finding that the Act is remedial with regard to the Government, the Court’s
opinion in Stevens muddied the waters regarding the punitive versus remedial nature of
the Act with regard to relators. As part of its holding, the Stevens Court, without any
historical analysis or the application of any test for distinguishing “punitive” civil actions
from “remedial” civil actions, characterized the treble damages and civil penalty
provisions of the Act as “punitive.”88

The Court did not distinguish between the

“punitive” purposes of the Act’s remedies as applied by a qui tam relator versus their
84

31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(4) (2000). Out of 3,954 qui tam cases filed through September 30, 2002, the
Government had intervened in only 718 cases as of December 16, 2002. 2 BOESE, supra note 4, Appendix
H-1. These statistics indicate that it is uncommon for the Government to intervene, either at the inception
of the case or later for “good cause.”
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529 U.S. at 786.
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Id. at n.15.
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Id., quoting Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); see also Cook County, Illinois v.
United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 133 (2003), quoting S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 2 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266 (stating that the basic purpose of the 1986 amendments was to make
the Act a “more useful tool” to combat fraud against the Government) (emphasis added).
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Stevens, 529 U.S. at 784-785. The Court used the punitive characterization of damages under the Act to
bolster its argument that Congress did not intend to include the states, which are immune from punitive
damages at common law, in the definition of “persons” who could be liable under the Act. Id.
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“remedial” purposes as applied by the United States, although long-standing precedent
permitted the Court to make such a distinction.89
After Stevens, lower federal courts were left with little guidance on how to
characterize the Act for purposes of applying it to cases where the defendant was
traditionally immune from punitive damages, and the Government had declined to
intervene in the case.

It is not surprising that lower courts came to conflicting

conclusions regarding the applicability of the Act to municipalities, thatengage in a great
deal of contracting with the Government, yet are traditionally immune from punitive
damages.90 It is also not surprising that a federal court faced with the specific question of
survivability of a relator’s action struggled to answer the question consistent with
Vermont Agency and the historical common-law test. In United States ex rel. Harrington
v. Sisters of Providence in Oregon,91 the only reported case since Stevens to decide the
question of whether a cause of action brought by a qui tam relator under the Act survives
the relator’s death, the court attempted to apply the traditional common-law test of
“remedial” versus “punitive” to the question. Trying to reconcile legislative history
indicating that the Act was primarily meant to be remedial with Vermont Agency’s
characterization of the current version of the Act as “punitive,” the Harrington court held
that even if the Act could still be considered remedial after Vermont Agency, because
Harrington had not alleged personal or substantial individual harm, the claim was not
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See, e.g., Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668-669 (1892).
Compare United States ex rel. Chandler v. Cook County, 277 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2002), aff’d sub nom.
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remedial as to him, and did not survive his death.92 The Harrington court did not
consider the effect of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Vermont Agency that
the injured party was the Government, which survives the relator’s death.93
Shortly thereafter, in Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler94 the
United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify its statements regarding the punitive
versus remedial nature of the treble damages provisions of the Act, at least for purposes
of applying the Act to municipalities that are immune from punitive damages at common
law.

The Chandler Court characterized the Act’s treble damages as having a

“compensatory side, serving remedial purposes in addition to punitive objectives.”95 The
Court specifically acknowledged the role the presence of a qui tam relator plays in
characterizing the Act’s damages as “compensatory,” retreating from its prior statement
in Vermont Agency that treble damages under the Act were “punitive.” 96 The Court reemphasized that the purpose of the statute was public, to compensate the Government,
rather than to redress a qui tam relator’s individual wrong.97
2.

The Modern Formulation of the Historical Test of Survivability

In Murphy v. Household Finance Corp.,98 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit articulated a test that is widely use for characterizing a federal statutory
cause of action as “penal” or “remedial.”99 The Murphy test was created from earlier
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538 U.S. 119 (2003).
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Id. at 130; see also, United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter, Mackby I]
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560 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1977).
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judicial pronouncements of the factors a court should consider in determining the penal
versus remedial nature of a federal statute.100 Under the Murphy test, a court looks at:
(1) Whether the purpose of the statute is to redress individual wrongs or more general
wrongs to the public;101 (2) whether recovery under the statute runs to the harmed
individual, or to the public;102 and (3) whether the recovery authorized by the statute is
wholly disproportionate to the harm suffered.103 Although this test has not explicitly been
adopted by the United States Supreme Court, its elements are rooted in long-standing
precedents discussing what a court should consider when determining the “penal” or
“remedial” nature of a statute.104 Although the Murphy test has both a historical pedigree
and a degree of flexibility, because of the dual nature of the Act and the differing
interests and rights of the two parties deemed to be plaintiffs in a qui tam case, analyzing
the Act under each of the test’s prongs does not yield a satisfactory answer to the
question of whether a qui tam case survives the death of the relator.
a.

The Purpose of the Act

As illustrated in Section II (B), supra, the text and the legislative history of the
1986 Amendments do little to clear up the confusion regarding the punitive versus
remedial nature of the Act.105 Historically, breaches of public rights and duties, which

States ex rel. Neher v. NEC, 11 F.3d 136, 137 (11th Cir. 1994), the court used the Murphy test to determine
survivability of a qui tam case under the Act.
100
See Murphy, 560 F.2d at 208-209, quoting Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), and earlier cases
cited therein at length.
101
Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668; Murphy, 560 F.2d at 209; 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161.
102
Murphy, 560 F.2d at 209; Read v. Stewart, 129 Mass. 407, 410 (1880).
103
Murphy, 560 F.2d at 209; see also, Stevenson v. Stoufer, 21 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Iowa 1946) (recovery of
$1750 based on overcharges totaling $26.25 under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 indicated that
the cause of action created by the statute was penal, rather than remedial).
104
See, e.g, Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668; Read, 129 Mass. at 410 (1880).
105
This confusion regarding the punitive or remedial nature of statutory treble damages provisions is not
unique to the Act. It also appears in construction of the federal antitrust laws and their treble damages
provisions. See 54 AM. JUR. 2d Monopolies and Restraints of Trade §393 (2004); Cinnamon v. Abner A.
Wolf, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 833, 837 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
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affect the whole community, are “distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and
misdemeanors,” and sanctions for such breaches are considered punitive.106 Given that
the historical purpose of the Act, including its qui tam provisions, was to redress and
deter general wrongs to the public, and the strong legislative history indicating that the
1986 Amendments to the Act have, first and foremost, the purpose of redressing general
wrongs to the public, one could argue that the Act should be considered punitive, despite
the continual insistence of Congress that its purpose is remedial.

The traditional

“punitive” versus “remedial” distinction simply does not fit a federal statute designed to
redress financial losses to the Government, as well as to deter violations of public rights
and duties. It does not provide guidance for a court to determine whether such a statute
can or should be considered to redress an “individual” harm, albeit a harm to the
Government, such that a cause of action brought under the statute should survive the
relator, who has not suffered personal harm.
b.

The Relationship Between the Relator and the Government and the
Concept of a “Harmed Individual.”

The relationship between the relator and the United States has been described as
one of “mandated cooperation.”107 The Act contemplates the relator working with the
Government, but the Government exercising significant control over the case.108 When
the United States intervenes in the action, it has the power to dismiss the action over the
objections of the relator,109 settle the action over the objections of the relator,110 and
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restrict the participation of the relator in the action.111 Even when the United States
declines to intervene in the case, the United States may move to dismiss the relator’s
case, if it believes that pursuing the case is not in the Government’s best interests.112 This
intricate and unique relationship between the relator and the Government, where the two
parties who are supposedly aligned in interest disagree about the merits of and/or the
methodology for pursuing the case, is one of the factors that makes application of the
historical test for survivability of a federal statutory cause of action unworkable with
regard to qui tam actions brought under the Act.
A relator sues on behalf of the United States as well as himself.113 In Stevens,114
the United States Supreme Court unequivocally stated that this language means that the
relator is not merely a mechanism of enforcement, as had been suggested by some lower
federal courts.115 For the first time, the Court stated that a qui tam relator is a partial
assignee of the United States’ injury in fact, with standing to assert a claim on his own
111

31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(2)(C) (2000).
See Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 251-252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 944 (2003); United
States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing Co., 151 F. 3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998); Juliano v.
Federal Asset Disposition Ass’n., 736 F. Supp. 348, 351 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir.
1992). Although cooperation between the relator and the Government is likely and expected when the
United States intervenes in the action and prosecutes the case, this cooperative atmosphere often evaporates
when the United States declines to intervene, or when the interests of the United States and the interests of
the relator do not coincide. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 n.5
(1997). Case law is replete with references to conflicts between the relator and the United States when the
United States has declined to intervene in a case under the Act, and the relator has taken action of which the
United States does not approve. See, e.g., Schimmels and United States v. Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875 (9th
Cir. 1997) (United States attempts to escape the outcome of the relator’s adversary proceeding in
bankruptcy against a defendant under the Act after it declined to intervene in the relator’s proceeding);
United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrup, 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994) (United States objects to
settlement of case brought by relator under the Act, alleging collusion between the relator and the
defendant to deprive the United States of its fair share of the settlement). Likewise, relators often claim
that the United States does not represent their interests in conjunction with cases brought under the Act.
See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 1997) (relator alleges that his interests
are not adequately represented by the United States in an action collateral to a claim brought by the relator
under the Act, because the United States had not yet decided whether to intervene in the relator’s action).
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behalf, not merely as a tool of the Government.116 Although the Court’s characterization
of the relator as a partial assignee assures the relator’s status as something more than a
mechanism of enforcement, in so holding, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the idea
that a qui tam relator alleges a personal injury sufficient to confer constitutional standing
to bring a claim under the Act.117 According to the Court, the qui tam relator has no
personal injury even if alleging having suffered personal harm or difficulty as a result of
the defendant’s actions.118 The Court thereby rejected a concept that was embraced by
some lower courts to explain why the relator had constitutional standing to bring suit.119
The characterization of the relationship between the qui tam relator and the
United States also affects the characterization of the recovery that the qui tam relator
receives. As the Vermont Agency Court stated, if the relator is merely a statutorily
designated agent of the United States, “the relator’s bounty is simply the fee he receives
out of the United States’ recovery for filing and/or prosecuting a successful action on
behalf of the Government.”120 If this was the case, and the relator’s standing to sue in a
qui tam case brought under the Act is merely as an agent of the United States, the bounty
a successful relator received under the Act should have the same character as the United
States’ recovery. If treble damages and penalties of up to $11,000 per claim under the
116

Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773.
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Act are punitive when there is no qui tam relator, then they should be punitive when
collected through the actions of the qui tam relator as an agent. If they are remedial, then
they should be remedial whether collected via a qui tam relator agent or by the United
States acting alone.
As the Stevens Court recognized, characterizing the qui tam relator as an agent of
the United States reads the Act’s language authorizing a person to bring a civil action
under the Act “for the person” as well as for the United States Government out of the
Act, and therefore the Act.121 Therefore, the Act should not be so construed.

122

By

characterizing the qui tam relator as a “partial assignee” of the United States, the Court
remained true to the text of the statute, and avoided reading this provision out of the
statute, in accordance with the tenets of statutory construction.
Nevertheless, the Court’s characterization of the relator as a “partial assignee”
makes application of the second prong of the Murphy formulation of the common-law
test to determine survivability of a qui tam action under the Act unworkable. An assignee
typically stands in the shoes of the assignor with respect to both the injury and the
remedy.123 But the typical assignee has paid some consideration to the assignor for the
assignment,124 which is not the case for qui tam relators.

Furthermore, it is well-

established that a “claim” cannot simply refer to the right to bring suit.125 Congress
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cannot grant standing to party based on only a public interest in the proper administration
of the laws.126
Therefore, it remains unclear what part of the United States’ claim under the Act
is assigned to the relator. It cannot be only the right to sue. The partial assignment of the
United States’ “claim” to the relator may include an assignment of part of the United
States’ actual injury. The Government may be considered a “harmed individual,” and the
relator therefore be considered to have assigned status as a “harmed individual.”127 But
because only the United States is injured in a cause of action brought under the Act,
although recovery under the statute runs to both the qui tam relator and the Government,
it may be that there is no “harmed individual,” and the statute is punitive with regard to
both the relator and the Government.128
Historically, if a cause of action was assignable, then it was also considered to be
survivable.129 The Court’s characterization of the Act as providing a right that is at least
partially assignable supports a finding that the Act survives the death of a party under the
long-accepted common-law rule,130 but contradicts the Court’s insistence that the qui tam
relator has no personal injury for purposes of constitutional standing. The Court may not
have realized that its characterization of the qui tam relator as a partial assignee for
purposes of standing in Stevens could have implications for determining the survivability
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of a cause of action under the Act. Nevertheless, shortly after the Stevens decision, the
Court had an opportunity to undo some of the mischief it had wrought by characterizing
the Act’s treble damages as penal. In Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel.
Chandler,131 the Court unanimously determined that municipalities, which are presumed
to be immune from punitive damages, were subject to suit under the Act.132 The Court
described the Act’s treble damages provision as having a “compensatory side, serving
remedial purposes in addition to punitive objectives.”133 The Court explained:
There is no question that some liability beyond the amount of the
fraud is usually ‘necessary to compensate the government completely for
the costs, delays, and inconveniences occasioned by fraudulent claims’
[Citations omitted]. The most obvious indication that the treble damages
ceiling has a remedial place under this statute is its qui tam feature with its
possibility of diverting as much as 30 percent of the Government’s
recovery to a private relator who began the action. In qui tam cases the
rough difference between double and triple damages may well serve not to
punish, but to quicken the self-interest of some private plaintiff who can
spot violations and start litigating to compensate the Government, while
benefiting himself as well.134
The Court further explained that even in the absence of a qui tam relator, treble damages
may be necessary for the Government to fully recover what it lost due to the fraud.135 The
Court supported its characterization of treble damages as remedial by noting that the Act
has no separate provisions for prejudgment interest, nor does it provide for recovery of
consequential damages.136
The Court’s pronouncements in Stevens and Chandler suggest that even when the
qui tam relator receives the maximum recovery permitted under the Act, because the
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relator is not personally injured by the wrongdoer’s conduct, the recovery is to
compensate for an offense to the public. But these pronouncements also suggest that the
entire award, including the treble damages, is designed to ensure that the United States is
made whole, and that public rights and duties are protected and enforced.
c.

Proportionality of Recovery Under the Act

In keeping with the Act’s purpose of compensating an injured Government, in
United States v. Bornstein137 the Supreme Court characterized the Act’s then-double
damages and money penalties of $2,000 per claim as remedial rather than punitive.138
Nevertheless, when the statute was amended in 1986 to authorize treble damages139 and
civil penalties of up to $10,000 per claim,140 Congress stated that the enhanced remedy
remained remedial, although intended to make the Government whole through a form of
“rough justice,” rather than precisely compensate the Government for its losses.141 When
amending the Act in 1986, Congress believed that “[E]ven in the cases where there is no
dollar loss—for example where a defense contractor certifies an untested part for quality
yet there are no apparent defects—the integrity of quality requirements in procurement
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programs is seriously undermined.”142

Under the Act, money penalties are usually

imposed,143 even when the Government has suffered little or no loss from the defendant’s
false claims.144 Because penalties can be imposed even in the absence of any actual
damages, many courts acknowledge that at least the money penalties under the Act are
punitive in nature, and that they are clearly disproportionate to the damage done.145 The
courts’ discomfort with the imposition of large fines that are disproportionate to actual
harm done has led to some creative approaches to counting false claims for purposes of
imposing damages and penalties.
United States v. Krizek146 is a good example of the courts’ creative approach to
alleviating the discomfort they experience when applying what they consider to be the
disproportionate remedies of the Act. In Krizek, an elderly psychiatrist and his wife, who
was his office manager, were found liable under the Act for submitting false claims to the
Government for Medicare and Medicaid payments over a period of six years.147 Because
of the difficulty of determining which claims were false, the district court determined that
on a day where Dr. Krizek submitted claims for time spent with patients in excess of nine
142
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hours, all claims submitted in excess of the nine-hour benchmark would be considered
false, and penalties under the Act would be assessed for each such claim.148
Nevertheless, because the claims sent to the Government indicated only the type of
service performed, not the precise length of the service, the Special Master appointed by
the district court to calculate Dr. Krizek’s liability assumed that each service took the
minimum amount of time, and calculated the excess number of claims on that basis.149
Using this methodology, “the Special Master identified 264 days on which the Krizeks
billed for more than nine hours, amounting to 1,149 false claims. Multiplying by $5,000,
the minimum fine per claim under the False Claims Act, the Special Master calculated a
total fine of $5.7 million.”150
The district court accepted the Special Master’s findings of fact, but apparently
uncomfortable with the size of the fine, abandoned the nine-hour benchmark.151 Instead,
the district court adopted a twenty-four hour benchmark, holding that the Krizeks would
only be liable for claims submitted on days when they billed for more than twenty-four
hours of work, and only for the services that were rendered after twenty-four hours had
passed on a particular day.152 Using this new benchmark, the court assessed a $10,000
maximum fine under the Act for each of eleven false claims, entering judgment against
the Krizeks for $110,000.153
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the district court, instructing it
to consider each billing form submitted by the Krizeks as a single claim, regardless of
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how many services for a patient were recorded on the form.154 It also instructed the
district court to allow the Government to introduce evidence refuting the Special Master’s
use of the minimum amount of time that could be attributed to a particular service, and to
introduce evidence that Dr. Krizek also saw private-pay patients on days when he billed
excessively, thus potentially increasing the number of Medicare and Medicaid claims
submitted in excess of twenty-four hours a day.155 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit did not
overturn the district court’s use of the twenty-four hour benchmark, which was favorable
to the Krizeks. The D.C. Circuit was apparently uncomfortable with the enormity of the
original $5.7 million civil penalty imposed under the Act compared with the harm to the
Government caused by the Krizeks.156
d.

The Excessive Fines Clause

Courts recently have held that penalties and treble damages awarded under the
Act that are disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant’s offense implicate the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.157
Only punitive forfeitures implicate the Excessive Fines Clause.158 By holding that the
154

Id. at 1027.
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The D.C. Circuit also expressed its displeasure with the Government’s prolonged prosecution of the
case, stating:
“ This prosecution of a single doctor has now spanned over six years. It has consumed three
weeks of trial, several days of hearings before the Special Master and the district court, two fully briefed,
fully argued appeals, and five published opinions (three by the district court and two by this court). The
five days on which the false claims were made occurred over twelve years ago. According to defense
counsel, Dr. Krizek no longer practices medicine and is dying of cancer. . . . It is time for the parties to stop
refighting battles long-ago lost and for the district court to bring this prosecution to an expeditious close.”
Id. at 1031.
Despite the D.C. Circuit’s desire that the litigation would end, after remand to the district court for
recalculation of damages, the Krizeks appealed to the D.C. Circuit again, advocating a new theory of
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penalties and treble damages awarded under the Act implicate the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment, the courts have implicitly held that sanctions under the Act are
punitive, without analyzing whether the Murphy (or any other) factors support such a
characterization.159 In deeming statutory treble damages “punitive,” the courts have also
ignored some obvious differences between true punitive damages and statutory treble
damages.

As the Fifth Circuit has noted:

“[P]unitive damages are awarded under

notoriously open-ended legal standards and a broadly defined constitutional limit
concerning the amount awarded.

Treble damages, however, represent a mere

mathematical expansion of the actual damages calculated [by the arbitrator].”160 The
limited nature of statutory treble damages may distinguish them from open-ended
punitive damages in application of the Excessive Fines Clause.161
Despite all of the courts’ creativity in minimizing the disproportionate impact of
sanctions under the Act, it is difficult to find a general rule explaining when recovery
under the Act is disproportionate to the harm suffered, such that the Act would be
considered punitive in nature under the Murphy test. As the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in Mackby II, there is no rigid set of factors used to decide whether a fine
is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.162 The Mackby II court looked at
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See United States v. Mackby (Mackby II), 339 F.3d at 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
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under the Act are remedial, based on cases construing the pre-Amendment Act’s sanctions as remedial.
Mackby II, 339 F.3d at 1019.
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Investment Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2002); see also,
Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 132 (2003).
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See, e.g., Investment Partners, id. at 318 (holding that antitrust treble damages may be “punitive”
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for purposes of interpreting the scope of an arbitration clause). In Chandler, 538 U.S. at 130, the Court
implicitly recognized the difference between true punitive damages and the treble damages available under
the Act by characterizing the treble damages as a “ceiling.”
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Mackby II, 339 F.3d at 1016. Likewise, “[I]t would be difficult if not impossible in many cases for a
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the presence or absence of related illegal activity, the amount of actual harm caused to the
government and others, and the criminal penalties available under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines163 for violating similar criminal statutes to make this determination.164 The
court also considered the relationship between the sanctions imposed by the lower court
and the maximum possible sanctions authorized by Congress, and the Act’s scienter
requirement.165 Based on these factors, the Mackby II court held that a judgment of
$729,454.92 under the Act based on actual damages to the Government of $58,151.64
was not “grossly disproportionate” and did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause.166
e.

Cases Where There Is No Damage

The analysis called for by the third prong of Murphy has no meaning when
monetary penalties are imposed under the Act, but the Government has suffered no
monetary damage. Such cases are much more like Blackstone’s description of punitive
“crimes and misdemeanors,” than remedial actions to make an injured party whole.167
The money penalties imposed in such a case are by definition disproportionate to the
monetary harm inflicted on the United States. This is true even if some liability beyond
the amount of the fraud is required to completely compensate the Government for losses

of making the Government whole, but beyond which the sanction takes on the quality of punishment.”
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989)
163
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §2B1.1(b)(1) (2001).
164
Mackby II, 339 F.3d at 1017.
165
Id.
166
Id. The court noted that the maximum civil penalty Mackby faced was $84,990,000. If the Mackby II
court’s assumption that the Act’s sanctions are mainly punitive in nature is accepted, I would expect to see
future challenges to large awards under the Act on the grounds that they violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in accordance with the United States Supreme
Court’s recent resurrection of the concept of economic substantive due process when reviewing awards of
punitive damages. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (both holding that large punitive
damage awards under state law violate the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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caused by the fraudulent claims.168 The pre-1986 version of the Act, which imposed lessonerous penalties than those of the current Act, but had been construed to allow
imposition of such penalties even in the absence of actual damages, was remedial.169 The
fact that the penalties imposed are higher after the 1986 Amendments to the Act than the
penalties imposed under earlier versions of the Act should not matter for purposes of
proportionality when the Government has suffered no damages. Whether the penalties
are $2,000 per claim, as they were under older versions of the Act, or $10,000 per claim,
as they are under the current version of the Act, the ratio of penalties to damages when
the damages are zero will still be mathematically undefined, and by their very nature,
disproportionate to damages suffered by the Government.
B.

Using “Civil” and “Criminal” Designations as a Proxy for “Remedial” and
“Punitive” Characterizations
Attempts to simplify the analysis of survivability under the common-law test by

using the label of “civil” or “criminal” as a guide to the true nature of the Act are also
unavailing. Although one would assume that criminal statutes “punish,” while civil
statutes “compensate” or “remediate,” the label “civil” or “criminal” placed on a statute
by Congress does not answer the question of whether a statutory action is “penal” or
“remedial” under the law. Civil remedies can be transformed into criminal penalties if
they are severe enough in purpose or effect.170 The United States Supreme Court has
instructed that “[e]ven in those cases where the legislature ‘has indicated an intention to
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so
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punitive either in purpose or effect,’171 as to transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a
civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’ ”172
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has also instructed that “‘[o]nly
the clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”173 Despite the courts’ direction that
Congress’ denomination of a statute as “civil” or “criminal” should be treated with the
utmost respect, a statute characterized by Congress as “civil,” may be considered “penal”
for certain purposes, even if it is not characterized as “criminal.”174 The question then
becomes whether the statute is penal for all purposes, including the survivability analysis,
or only for selected purposes.
In a series of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the
Act is penal for some, but not all purposes, and its denomination as a “civil” statute is not
helpful when distinguishing between the two. In United States v. Halper,175 the appellee
was convicted of 65 counts of violation of the criminal False Claims Act.176 After
Halper’s criminal conviction, the Government brought an action under the civil False
171

Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956).
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Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100; quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
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See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989) (The labels “criminal” and “civil” are not of
paramount importance when determining whether a statutory sanction implicates the Double Jeopardy
Clause), overruled on other grounds by Hudson, 522 U.S. 93.
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The Court first grappled with the “civil” versus “criminal” nature of the Act in applying the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution to the Act in United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). In that case, actual damages to the Government were $101,500,
and the total recovery was $315,000 ($203,000 in double damages and $112,000 in penalties). Id. at 540.
The total recovery to the Government, after the qui tam relators took their share, was only $150,000. Id. at
545. The Court held that this amount was purely remedial, because it compensated the Government for
ancillary costs, such as the costs of detection and investigation, and therefore it did not implicate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 551-552. The present-day Act, which requires sanctions of treble damages
and as much as $11,000 per-claim penalties, is far more likely to yield a recovery to the Government that is
disproportionate to the damages and the ancillary costs incurred by the Government.
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18 U.S.C. §287 (2000). Halper submitted 65 demands for reimbursement from the federal Medicare
program over the course of two years at a rate of $12 per claim, when the actual service rendered entitled
him to only $3 per claim. 49 U.S. at 436. This resulted in an overpayment of $585. Id.
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Claims Act based on the same transactions that formed the basis for the criminal
conviction.177 The statutory penalty called for by the Act totaled $130,000, while the
actual damages to the Government totaled $585.178

The district court regarded the

$130,000 penalty to be so disproportionate to the actual damages incurred by the
Government (more than 220 times greater than actual damages) that it characterized the
money penalty as a “punishment” that violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, despite the
statute’s label as “civil.”179
The United States Supreme Court agreed, stating:
Although, taken together, these cases180 establish that proceedings and
penalties under the civil False Claims Act are indeed civil in nature, and
that a civil remedy does not rise to the level of “punishment” merely
because Congress provided for civil recovery in excess of the
Government’s actual damages, they do not foreclose the possibility that in
a particular case a civil penalty authorized by the Act may be so extreme
and so divorced from the Government’s damages and expenses as to
constitute punishment.181

The Court stated the question to be answered in Halper as: “[W]hether a civil
sanction, in application, may be so divorced from any remedial goal that it constitutes
‘punishment’ for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.”182 The Court noted that prior
cases were not helpful in answering the question, because they did not address situations
where a statutory imprecise formula for damages authorizes a remedial sanction that is
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completely disproportionate to the Government’s damages and actual costs.183 Writing
on a clean slate, the Court said:
[A] civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the
sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment . .
. it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to
understand the term.184
The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to a defendant who has been
criminally prosecuted and punished, and then is subjected to a civil sanction, if the
second sanction is fairly characterized as solely deterrent or retributive.185 Nevertheless,
the Court was careful to point out that this rule is for the “rare case” where the civil
penalty sought in a proceeding, after a criminal penalty has been imposed, is
“overwhelmingly” disproportionate to the damages the offender has caused.186 Although
the Court explicitly left the determination of what constitutes an “overwhelmingly”
disproportionate penalty to the discretion of the trial court, it specifically mentioned the
increased civil penalties of the 1986 Amendments to the Act as an example of a civil
sanction that would constitute a second punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.187
Halper appeared to establish that when sanctions imposed under the Act were
“overwhelmingly” disproportionate to the Government’s damages, the Act was punitive.
In so doing, the Court elevated the deterrent and retributive purposes of the Act over the
remedial purposes of the Act, even when the Act allowed recovery of only double
damages and smaller money penalties than are permitted under today’s Act.
183
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Eight years later, in Hudson v. United States,188 the appellants, relying on Halper,
challenged a criminal prosecution initiated by the United States after the federal Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency imposed monetary penalties and administrative
debarment on them for violation of a federal banking statute under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.189 The criminal prosecution was based on the same transactions that were the
basis for the prior administrative actions.190 The Court, citing “concerns about the wide
variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned in the wake of Halper,”191 breathed life
back into the labels “criminal” and “civil” by emphasizing that the Double Jeopardy
Clause “protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the
same offense.”192 The Court reiterated that in the first instance, one must look to
Congress’ express or implied label of “civil” or “criminal” for the statute, and that a
statute that had been labeled “civil” by Congress could only be transformed into a
criminal penalty if its punitive purpose or effect is “overwhelming.”193

The Court

described the following “useful guideposts” for determining whether a statutory scheme
is punitive in either purpose or effect so as to transform a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty:
‘(1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint’;
(2) ‘whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment’; (3)
‘whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter’; (4) ‘whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence’; (5) ‘whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime’; (6) ‘whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
188
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connected is assignable for it’; and (7) ‘Whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.’194
The Court criticized its decision in Halper as having bypassed the threshold question of
whether the successive punishment was “criminal,” and because it focused on the
disproportionality of the sanction to the damage without considering the other
guideposts.195 The Court also retreated from its focus on the character of the sanctions
imposed in Halper, and emphasized the importance of relying on Congress’
characterization of a statute as “civil.”196 According to the Court, the protections of the
Double Jeopardy Clause are unnecessary in cases of civil fines, because the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines protections apply to such cases.197 Furthermore, the Court
acknowledged that attempting to distinguish between “punitive” and “nonpunitive”
penalties was inordinately confusing, and that the confusion outweighed the benefit of the
additional protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.198
Hudson establishes that civil penalties are not subject to analysis under the
Double Jeopardy Clause, and that such an analysis is reserved for criminal penalties. But
Halper and Hudson also establish that a “civil” action can be “punitive” even if it is not
“criminal,” without specifically deciding whether a cause of action brought under the
current version of the Act was such an action, and if so, under what circumstances.
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Therefore, we must look beyond the label of “civil” or “criminal” to determine whether a
cause of action is punitive or remedial, and whether it survives the death of a party. In
the case of the Act, the civil label Congress has placed on the statute is particularly
unhelpful to this analysis, because the United States Supreme Court has described the
treble damages authorized under the Act as both “punitive in nature,”199 and as having a
“remedial place.”200
V.
A.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE ACT

Public Disclosure and “Original Source”
The historical common-law tests of survivability also do not account for

challenges created by a unique provision in the Act limiting the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction over certain qui tam cases. The 1943 version of the Act contained a revised
jurisdictional bar designed to prevent the filing of “parasitic” lawsuits such as United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,201 where the relator merely copied the Government’s preexisting pleadings and filed a qui tam suit. This provision stated that no court would
have jurisdiction over a qui tam suit if the government had prior knowledge of the
allegations in the complaint.202 In 1986, under the impression that as much as ten percent
of the entire federal budget was being lost to fraud,203 Congress amended the
jurisdictional bar to make it possible for qui tam relators to bring private suits based on
information that was already in the public domain, but which the relator had brought to
the public domain as the “original source:”
199
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No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional,
administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of
the information.
For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information
on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the
information to the Government before filing an action under this section
which is based on the information.204
Although the meaning of this section, commonly known as the “public
disclosure” bar, has been the subject of extensive litigation,205 it is clear that a court has
no subject matter jurisdiction over a qui tam case brought under the Act if the case is
based on a public disclosure, and the relator is not an original source of the information
on which the allegations are based.206 In a case where the qui tam relator acknowledges
that the suit is based on publicly disclosed information, or where the defendant
establishes that there has been a public disclosure of such information despite the
relator’s insistence to the contrary, the court must decide whether the relator is an
“original source” of the information in order to establish that it has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case prior to proceeding to the merits.207 The federal courts cannot
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hypothesize subject matter jurisdiction in order to decide the merits of a case.208 The qui
tam relator has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his suit is
not based upon a public disclosure, or, if it is, that he was an original source of the
information.209
To be an “original source,” the relator must have “direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based.”210

“Direct

knowledge” is firsthand knowledge, gained without any intervening agency or outside
influence.211 “Independent knowledge” is defined as knowledge independent of any
public disclosure.212 When a qui tam relator files a suit under the Act, the relator is
required to prepare and serve on the Government “a written disclosure of substantially all
material evidence and information” the relator possesses.213 In addition to educating the
Government about the case so that the Government can decide whether or not to
intervene, the disclosure statement also assists the court in determining whether the
relator has the “direct and independent knowledge” necessary to maintain a suit where
information has been publicly disclosed.214
B.
208

Discovery Issues
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The law is unsettled as to whether a defendant can discover the relator’s
disclosure statement to the Government. In one line of cases, the courts have held that no
privilege attaches to the disclosure statement and supplementary materials, and have
permitted discovery.215 Other courts have held that the disclosure statement is subject to
the attorney work product privilege,216 the joint prosecution privilege,217 or the law
enforcement privilege.218 Still other courts have permitted discovery of some parts of the
disclosure statement, but not others.219
Even if the disclosure statement is discoverable, defendants are likely to zealously
advocate that it is no substitute for the ability to cross-examine the relator regarding the
source of his knowledge of publicly disclosed information. Obviously, the most relevant
and fruitful source for discovery on issues of the relator’s direct and independent
knowledge of information forming the allegations of the complaint is the relator. The
relator’s deposition is virtually irreplaceable to defendants attempting to refute a relator’s
allegations that the relator is an “original source” in cases where there has been a public
disclosure.220
215
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When the relator dies before the defendant has taken the relator’s deposition, even
if the court believes that the disclosure statement and the material evidence contained
therein are sufficient for the court to determine that it does have jurisdiction, the
defendant will argue that it is severely prejudiced due to its inability to cross-examine the
relator regarding public disclosure and original source allegations. A court may order
dismissal as a remedy to prevent unfairness to a defendant due to an inability to obtain
discovery from a plaintiff.221 Nevertheless, the death of a plaintiff prior to discovery of
the plaintiff does not automatically mandate dismissal of the claim.222 A court will
balance the prejudice to the defendant caused by the death of the plaintiff against the
right of the plaintiff’s successors to pursue the suit.223 There are no reported cases in
which the court has engaged in such a balancing test with regard to prejudice to a
defendant’s ability to assert the Act’s jurisdictional bar caused by a qui tam relator’s
death. Nevertheless, at least one case has suggested that if a plaintiff is an original and
direct source of information which formed the basis for a statement that was the subject
of a defamation action, and the defendant is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine

defendant was not prejudiced. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) at 13, Harrington (No. CV 98-1587-JO); see
also, 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶12.30[5] (3d ed. 2004). The relator’s
estate’s representative also reminded the court that the defendant had opposed a prior attempt by relator’s
counsel to perpetuate the relator’s testimony. Id. The defendants replied that regardless of whom has the
ultimate burden of proof on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the death of the relator severely
prejudiced the defendants’ ability to defend against the case, because it prejudiced the defendants’ ability to
even bring a motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, much less meet the
burden of proof on the motion. Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) at 7-9, Harrington (No.
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the plaintiff regarding the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statement, dismissal may be
required to alleviate the prejudice to the defendant.224
One commentator has suggested that prejudice to the defendant can be alleviated
in a case where a “private” plaintiff in a defamation action dies by shifting the burden of
proving that the statement is true from the defendant to the plaintiff, or by shifting the
burden of proving certain defenses from the defendant to the plaintiff.225 Although this
might relieve a defendant of an ultimate burden of proof on an issue at trial, such burdenshifting does not alleviate prejudice to a defendant caused by an inability to bring a
defensive motion to dismiss due to the defendant’s inability to meet the burdens of
production or proof on the motion because of the relator’s death. Nor does it relieve the
defendant of the prejudice caused by an inability to effectively challenge the relator’s
ability to meet the burden of proof on the issue, even if the initial burden is shifted to the
plaintiff. In a case brought under the Act, the determination of the relator’s original
source status is even more crucial than the ability to determine the truth of information
from its source in a defamation case.

Under the Act, the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction depends on the relator’s original source status, and the court cannot even
consider the merits of the case without making this threshold determination. Neither the
Murphy test nor any other historical test for survivability takes into account the
challenges raised by the Act’s jurisdictional bar in a case where the qui tam relator dies.
VI.
224
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Id. In MacDonald, the court contrasted the situation at hand, where the defendant was not claiming that
the plaintiff was the original and direct source of the information on which the allegedly defamatory
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A.

The Importance of Congressional Intent
In light of the difficulty of applying the historical test in determining whether a

qui tam relator’s cause of action under the Act survives the relator’s death, and the
unhelpfulness of Congress’ characterization of a statute as “civil” or “criminal,” “penal”
or “remedial” to make that determination, the courts must look to some other criteria to
determine whether a qui tam relator’s cause of action is survivable. Rather than trying to
stuff all federal statutory causes of action into the ancient “penal” or “remedial”
categories, in cases involving federal statutes that create rights that were unknown at
common law, codify rights that previously existed at common law, or significantly
modify rights that were codified centuries ago, if there is no explicit statutory provision
addressing survivability, the primary consideration should be whether survival of a cause
of action under the statute furthers the purpose of the statute as expressed by Congress. 226
The United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of congressional
intent when determining whether a federal statutory cause of action survives the death of
one of the parties in Cox v. Roth.227 In Cox, the Court was faced with the question of
whether an action brought under the Jones Act228 survives the death of the defendant
tortfeasor. The Cox Court acknowledged that at common law, actions for personal injury
abated upon the death of one of the parties, but characterized the rule as one of “extreme
harshness.”229 To alleviate the harshness of the common law rule, the Court looked to the
policy behind the Jones Act, which it understood to be to fully provide for compensation
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of injured seamen or their families regardless of the nature or identity of the tortfeasor.230
To explain its decision to abandon the common law rule regarding survivability, the
Court said:
The policy as well as the letter of the law is a guide to decision. Resort to
the policy of a law may be had to ameliorate its seeming harshness or to
qualify its apparent absolutes. . . The process of interpretation also misses
its high function if a strict reading of a law results in the emasculation or
deletion of a provision which a less literal leading would preserve.231
The Cox Court also noted that abandoning the common-law rule of survivability
of tort actions was in accordance with the trend among the states:
[W]e do note that advancing civilization and social progress have brought
43 of our States to include in their general law the principle of the survival
of causes of action against deceased tortfeasors, and that such recovery,
rather than being exceptional, has now become the rule in almost every
common-law jurisdiction.232
The courts’ willingness to elevate the policy of the law and Congress’ intent over
historical characterization need not be limited to statutes that codify common-law causes
of action, but may also be applied to statutes that create new federal causes of action,
unknown at common law, or significantly modify ancient causes of action. As the United
States Supreme Court said over 100 years ago; “[w]hether an action survives or abates
upon the death of a party depends on the substance of the action, not the forms of
proceedings to enforce the action.”233 Just as the historical “personal” versus “property”
nature of a tort need not be dispositive of the survivability of a tort action, the terms
“penal” or “remedial” need not be dispositive of the nature of federal statutory action.
Such terms are merely shorthand for the relevant considerations as to whether a cause of
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action should survive the death of a party.234 The question of survivability of a federal
statutory claim is essentially a question of statutory interpretation.235
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has recognized
the need to abandon the historical distinctions of “penal” versus “remedial” when it
comes to determining the survivability of federal statutes that create new rights, or
significantly change rights that existed at common law. For example, in Mallick v.
IBEW236 a member of a labor union sought disclosure of the union’s financial records
under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”).237
While an appeal of the trial court’s decision in favor of the plaintiff was pending, the
plaintiff died.238 The union argued that the plaintiff’s cause of action abated upon his
death, relying on the common law distinction between suits based on personal torts and
suits based on property or contract rights.239 The D.C. Circuit flatly stated that “these
cases no longer control adjudication of survivorship issues associated with federal
claims,” noting the “difficulty of forcing many newer statutory rights into its somewhat
archaic and rigid distinction between personal and property claims.”240
Rather than trying to determine whether a cause of action for disclosure of
financial information under the LMRDA was based on “personal” or “property” rights, or
was “penal” or “remedial,” the Mallick Court focused on the legislative history of the
LMRDA, which indicated that a major goal of the LMRDA was deterrence of financial
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abuses by unions.241 The Mallick Court held that the plaintiff’s cause of action for
disclosure of information under the LMRDA survived the plaintiff’s death, because the
statute’s goal of deterrence of financial wrongdoing by unions would be best served by
allowing an action for disclosure under the LMRDA to survive the death of a particular
union member.242
Twelve years later, in Sinito v. United States Department of Justice,243 the D.C.
Circuit held that a cause of action seeking the release of information held by the
Government under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)244 could survive the death
of a plaintiff. In Sinito, the defendant argued that under the historical common-law test,
FOIA was not a remedial statute, and therefore did not survive the death of the plaintiff
requesting information.245 Although the trial court agreed, and dismissed the case, the
D.C. Circuit, following its precedent in Mallick, disregarded the common-law rule.
Instead, it looked to whether allowing the action to survive the death of the plaintiff
would further Congress’ goals in enacting FOIA.246 The Sinito Court reviewed the
legislative history of FOIA, and held that allowing a case brought under FOIA to survive
the death of the plaintiff would foster one of the “paramount goals” of FOIA, the goal of
deterring secrecy in government and government corruption.247
The Sinito defendants tried to distinguish Mallick by arguing that FOIA creates a
right of access available to all citizens, as opposed to the defined class who are permitted
to exercise the right of access under the LMRDA, and thus, creates a right that was
241
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somehow less “personal” than the right held to survive the death of the plaintiff in
Mallick.248 The Sinito Court was unimpressed by this argument, and in holding that a
claim for disclosure under FOIA can survive the death of the plaintiff, noted:
Moreover, we are dealing here not with a vast pool of potential FOIA
applicants, any of whom might seek to take Thomas Sinito’s place in the
litigation. An original requestor who goes to court to compel disclosure
by the agency has a stake in the legal action which transcends that of “any
person” who might seek the FOIA document. He has invested time, and
in all likelihood money, in the action . . . . The fact that other citizens
could have brought a similar action originally in no way vitiates that
conclusion.249
The logic of Sinito applies equally to qui tam causes of action brought under the
Act. As in Sinito, a qui tam cause of action cannot be brought by any member of the
public. A cause of action under the Act sounds in fraud.

250

Therefore, it must be plead

with particularity.251 This operates to ensure that only persons with real knowledge of
actual fraud can bring such cases, as opposed to members of the public at large engaging
in “fishing expeditions.”252 Furthermore, the jurisdictional bar prevents members of the
public from engaging in copycat filings, further ensuring that a stranger to the alleged
fraud.253
B.

The Advantages of Using Congressional Intent to Determine Survivability
Applying the D.C. Circuit’s approach in Mallick and Sinito to qui tam cases

brought under the Act preserves the proper role of Congress in creating a cause of action,
and the proper role of the courts in interpreting its scope in accordance with Congress’
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will. 254

It also allows the courts to avoid trying to determine whether recovery runs to a

“harmed individual,” as required under the Murphy test, by parsing the complex and
contradictory relationship between the qui tam relator and the Government. The court is
also saved from having to choose between the punitive aspects of the Act and the
remedial aspects of the Act, and elevate one over the other, to reach a just result.
The legislative history of the 1986 Amendments to the Act makes it clear that
Congress intended the current version of the Act to be a mechanism to compensate the
Government for dollars lost to fraud, and to deter potential violatorsfrom embarking on a
course of defrauding the Government.

255

The Senate Report accompanying the 1986

Amendments states:
Even in the cases where there is no dollar loss—for example where a
defense contractor certifies an untested part for quality yet there are no
apparent defects—the integrity of quality requirements in procurement
programs is seriously undermined.256
The qui tam provisions of the original 1863 Act were:
passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern civilization,
that one of the least expensive and most effective means of preventing
frauds on the treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions
by private persons acting, if you please, under the strong stimulus of
personal ill will or the hope of gain.257
In the 1986 Amendments, Congress sought to increase the deterrent effect of the Act not
only by substantially increasing the amount of money that can be assessed against a
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defendant found liable, but by easing the restrictions on who can be a qui tam relator to
encourage fraud-fighting by private citizenry.258
C.

Applying the Test of Congressional Intent to the Act
The purposes of the Act are advanced by permitting a qui tam relator’s cause of

action under the Act to survive the death of the relator.

Furthermore, the Act’s

jurisdictional bar assures that no person other than the relator’s legal representative can
continue the suit, because once the qui tam case is filed, the information underlying the
allegations are publicly disclosed under the Act.259 Such a suit can only be pursued by
the original source of the information, and no outsider would qualify.260 If the relator’s
legal representative cannot pursue the case, no other private citizen will be able to do so,
and Congress’ intent to enlist and encourage private persons to assist the Government in
fighting fraud will be frustrated.261
Although allowing a qui tam action under the Act to survive the death of the
relator furthers the will of Congress, it does present the problem of potential prejudice to
defendants. Nevertheless, potential prejudice to defendants can be alleviated by applying
ordinary principles of federal civil procedure to each case on a case-by- case basis. In
cases where either the defendant or the relator has presented evidence that information on
which the allegations of the complaint are based was publicly disclosed, as defined by the
Act, and the relator dies, the court should decide whether the parties have had sufficient
258
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opportunity to develop the evidence regarding whether the relator was an “original
source” of the information.262 If the relator’s legal representative cannot establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the relator was an “original source,” the court must
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.263 If the court determines that
prejudice to the defendant caused by the relator’s death is so great that to allow the suit to
continue would be fundamentally unfair, the court can dismiss the case on those grounds,
without finding that the relator’s cause of action abates upon his death.264
The survival of an action imposing treble damages and money penalties against a
defendant, almost one-third of which may go to the estate of a relator who suffered no
injury, is troubling under the common law test for survivability of a federal statutory
action. Nevertheless, it is not particularly troubling under a public-policy- based test.
Congress’ stated purpose in increasing potential damages and penalties and making
private enforcement easier and more attractive was to pique the interest of private persons
in assisting the Government in fighting fraud. 265 The interest of an ill or elderly person,
who wishes to leave her estate to her legal representatives or successors, in assisting the
Government in fighting fraud, is likely to be as strong as the interest of a healthy or
young person in self-enrichment. Private antitrust cases brought under federal statutes
that authorize an award of treble damages have been held to survive a private plaintiff’s
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death, based on Congress’ intent to encourage private enforcement of the antitrust laws
through the treble damage remedy.266 Unlike a qui tam relator, who has no personal
injury of his own, a private plaintiff can only sue under the antitrust law if the plaintiff’s
business or property has been injured.267 Nevertheless, the qui tam relator’s status as a
“partial assignee” of the injured Government provides the relator status at least equivalent
to that of a person injured by an antitrust violation for purposes of survivability and
public policy. Even in cases where the Government has suffered no damages, the money
penalties available under the Act may serve to compensate the Government for nonrecoverable consequential damages, and this consequential injury may be part of the
Government’s “partial assignment” to the relator.268

Furthermore, the recent trend

towards applying the Excessive Fines Clause to recoveries under the Act,269 and the
reemergence of economic substantive due process in the context of punitive damage
awards, 270 make it likely that there are sufficient checks on the court’s ability to award
damages that are completely disproportionate to any harm suffered by the Government,
regardless of the survivability of the relator’s action.271
VI.
266

CONCLUSION

See Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Survival of Right of Action for Damages Based on Violation of
Federal Antitrust Laws, 11 A.L.R. FED. 963 n.14 (1972). Nevertheless, there is no agreement among the
courts as to whether treble damages survive the death of a private antitrust plaintiff, or if the legal
representative of the plaintiff is limited to pursuing actual damages. Id.
267
15 U.S.C. §15 (2004).
268
See 1 BOESE, supra note 4, §3.03[A][3].
269
See Section III(A)(2)(d) supra.
270
See note 166, supra.
271
It is also possible that a court could take the United States Supreme Court’s characterization of treble
damages as a “ceiling,” and impose less than treble damages in a case where the relator has died. Cook
County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 358 U.S.119, 130 (2003); see also Rogers v. Douglas
Tobacco Board of Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957) (in a private antitrust enforcement action, court
allowed the claim to survive, but limited recovery to actual damages after the defendant’s death); Stephanie
Trunk, Note, Sounding the Death Toll for Health Care Providers: How the Civil False Claims Act Has a
Punitive Effect and Why the Act Warrants Reform of Its Damages and Penalties Provision, 71 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 159, 174 (proposing a two-tiered damage and penalty structure for the Act to alleviate its punitive
effect).

51

Just as the pirate leaves a map for his successor to find the hidden treasures the
pirate accumulated in life, a qui tam relator’s complaint and disclosure statement are the
map left for successors or legal representatives to uncover fraud against the Government,
and reap the rewards of the relator’s discovery. The Act is a powerful tool that Congress
has created to protect the public fisc, deter fraud, and assist the Government in
uncovering fraud that has already occurred. None of these purposes are served by
abatement of relator’s action upon death, and they are furthered by permitting a relator’s
action to survive death and continue to be pursued by the relator’s legal representatives.
The statute’s jurisdictional bar, the inherent power of the courts to dismiss a case when
the defendant is excessively prejudiced by inability to defend against it, and the
constitutional protections against disproportionate remedies provide sufficient protections
for defendants who might be severely prejudiced by the death of the relator.
As more and more qui tam cases are brought,272 and they allege more and more
complicated fraudulent schemes, they take more and more time to work their way
through the Government’s investigative process and our overcrowded courts. the
likelihood of a relator dying before the case comes to its conclusion continues to increase.
A qui tam relator’s case under the Act has been described as “the gift that keeps on
giving.”273 The will of Congress, and protection of the public, is best served when the
gift of a relator’s claim under the Act can be given posthumously to the relator’s legal
representatives.
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